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ABSTRACT
Theory suggests that ticket-splitters often are 
the balance of power in elections, and constitute at 
least one-fourth of the American electorate. Ticket- 
splitting is not, however, motivated by party 
identification. Instead the voter's evaluation of the 
candidate, pertinent issues, and party attitudes 
contribute to their choice. Candidates, therefore, can 
attract electoral majorities by communicating certain 
messages through the identification, location, and 
targeting of ticket-splitters. This thesis will 
examine election data from 1952-1990. If the theory 
proves reliable and valid, the usefulness of the 
traditional two-party analysis of the modern electoral 
environment will be questioned.
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CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Party Identification 
The function of government in a democracy is to decide 
how competing interests are to be arbitrated in a fair 
and peaceful manner. How well the government, a 
representative democracy, serves this end is to be 
decided by the citizenry (Cantor 1975, 119). Elections 
are a constitutionally designed means by which 
knowledgeable voters can express their satisfaction 
with the performance of the government. The citizenry 
casts votes for candidates who they believe will best 
represent their interests and values through the forum 
of public debate.
All individuals have a rudimentary ability to 
understand and organize the political milieu (Niemi 
1993, 95). Political identity based on party 
membership, for example, serves as a means of 
enlightenment when deciding which candidate will 
represent one's interests best. Political party 
identification, along with views on specific policy
1
2questions and candidate approval judgements, are 
"psychological variables" that the voters consider when 
making an electoral decision (Cantor 1975, 16). Walter 
DeVries, borrowing from V.O.Key (1968) writes that 
"Voters' attitudes toward the issues, the candidates, 
and the parties are what is needed to understand 
elections" (DeVries 1972, 47). Traditionally, the 
extant literature suggests partisan identification by 
the voter has been the most capable predictor of voting 
behavior (Whiteley 1988, 961). As such, Robert Cantor, 
applying the conclusion of The Voter Decides (1954), 
wrote that party identification can be considered the 
single most important component in the voting decision 
among the general public (Cantor 1975, 17).
The classical study of political cognizance found 
in The American Voter, (Campbell et al., 1960) 
concludes that the electorate is neither overly 
ideological, nor are they aware of the issues, largely 
as a result of a general lack of interest in politics 
and its effect on their lives. They do, however, 
possess a partisan identification which is relatively 
stable (Kaufmann 1993, 3).
The strength of partisan stability allows for 
party strategies to play a preeminent role in the 
aggregation of voters. The party seeks to influence 
the electorate by running candidates on platforms,
3providing the means to enhance voter turnout, winning 
over the undecided and Independent voters, and 
generally trying to remove voter indifference (Flanigan 
1972, 41). According to Walter Dean Burnham, these 
activities are meant to "generate countervailing 
collective power" (Burnham 1972, p.257). Parties also 
allow the individual to gain political efficacy by 
coalescing with others to form an electoral majority.
In The Voter Decides (1954) and The American Voter 
(1960), party identification is given great primacy.
The importance of partisan sentiments is crucial in 
understanding and predicting voter behavior. Robert 
Erikson contends that "party identification is one of 
the most central and stable elements to a person's 
belief system" (Erikson 1988, 9). Moreover, it 
directly influences the voting act by affecting the 
political attitudes of the individual (Boyd 1969, 498). 
Because of this fact, Bruce Keith and his associates, 
borrowing from the Handbook of Social Psychology 
(1985), write that the National Election Studies use 
party identification as the "'foundation' of the 
'edifice' of conceptualizing and measuring voting" 
(Keith et al. 1986, 156).
Party identification is obtained early in life 
(Erikson 1988, 137). A 1963 study by Hess and Torney 
found that by the second grade, thirty-six percent of
the children identified with one of the major political 
parties. This increased to fifty-five percent by the 
fifth grade (Hess 1967, 96). Once a partisan 
identification is assumed, it takes a considerable 
amount of conflicting information before it can be 
rejected (Erikson 1988, 137).
Clearly, the reliability of partisan identity as 
it applies to the voting decision is still useful. It 
is the validity of the characteristic that is 
undergoing some consideration. Put another way, is the 
concept of partisan ideological self-identification an 
accurate measurement of future voting behavior?
This classical view is now being questioned by 
political scientists. It is being posited that 
elections and their results have less-and-less to do 
with the activities of political parties (Flanigan 
1972, 129). Instead, success depends on the self­
created and manufactured image of the candidate 
utilizing the current political issues and 
circumstances, and tactics to form a coalition of 
partisans with a critical and decisive minority of 
Independent voters (DeVries 1972, 91). This new school 
of thought suggests that the prediction probability of 
voter behavior is based less in partisan identity and 
party efforts, and has more to do with whether a voter 
finds a candidate appealing and has a positive
5affection for him or her (Erikson 1988, 274). Dr. Rob 
Melnick, of Arizona State University's Morrison 
Institute for Public Policy, warns that "...elected 
officials will have to build different coalitions for 
different issues, instead of relying on a single 
support base."1
This modern view of the electoral process 
questions the stability of partisan identification.
The image of the candidate is manipulated by the 
presentation of what William Flanigan describes as 
"short-run forces", which influence the election- 
specific voting decision of the voter, and mollify but 
do not alter past partisan identification (Flanigan 
1972, 48).
The method employed to gain electoral victory has 
less to do with party organizational effort and 
partisan loyalties, and more to do with the employment 
of mass media as a means of persuasion. Robert 
Erikson, among others, suggests that "television has 
allowed the candidate to campaign directly to the 
American people" (Erikson 1988, 228). The candidates 
themselves do not have to depend on the past electoral 
regime based around political parties, and the voters. 
Likewise, they are less inclined to use their partisan 
identification as a means of determining their vote.
The political process rests less with organizational
activities based on party loyalty, and can be better 
understood as an on-going two-way communication proces 
conducted between the candidate and the voter (DeVries 
1972, 73). Norman H. Nie and his associates (1979) 
write that "the frequency with which candidates are 
preferred or rejected because of party ties has 
declined" (Niemi 1993, 241).
Partisan identification as a political attitude 
does not exist in a vacuum. There has always been 
present within the American ethos a strong inclination 
towards independence, the antithesis of party 
identification. This mistrust is evident in the 
writings of the Founding Fathers. It is fed by the 
mistrust of government and fueled by anti-factionalism 
(Dennis 1988b, 204).
Initial inquiries into the nature of independence 
occurred at the beginning of this century. By 1936, 
George Gallup, of Gallup Poll fame, was measuring 
independence through a self-identified question in his 
polls (DeVries 1972, 40-41). This psychological 
affinity for independence was considered an accurate 
and sufficient method for defining the Independent 
voter. Put simply, to be an Independent meant that one 
was not a partisan.
Independence 
Political scientists now are reevaluating the
7concept of partisan identity to include not only 
partisanship, but also independence (Valentine 1980, 
165). Bruce Keith and his associates write, 
"Partisanship and independence are not mutually 
exclusive" (Keith 1986, 180). But, cautions by Jack 
Dennis, they "may Constitute two empirically 
distinguishable dimensions of attitudes." (Dennis 
1988a, p.84).
Prior scholarly analysis into independence, from 
George Gallup to Jack Dennis, has failed to develop a 
sufficient theory to explain the phenomenon. As Jack 
Dennis reports, "there is no convincing account of what 
it has come to mean to be independent" (Dennis 1988b, 
p.198). Motivated by the lack of a comprehensive 
theory concerning independence, scholars have been 
actively working towards that end. Jack Dennis reports 
that it is known, for example, "that independence is a 
multidimensional phenomenon" that includes "a complex 
of attitudes, meanings and associations" when it is 
used in self-labeling polling questions (Dennis 1988b,
p.201).
The main interest of this study is not in defining 
the voting patterns of the electorate by placing them 
into nominal classifications. Rather, the specific 
intent is to understand actual voting behavior. It 
must be clearly understood that self-identification as
an "Independent" by a poll respondent is not the same 
as actually demonstrating independence by virtue of 
splitting one's vote in an election (DeVries 1972, 14). 
DeVries' research conducted in 1967 reveals that voters 
whose self-perception is as an Independent is in 
reality an amalgam composed of Straight-Ticket 
Democrats and Republicans, along with ticket-splitters 
(DeVries 1972, 54). Independent self-identification is 
merely a psychological attribute, whereas ticket- 
splitting is a behavioral classification ascribed to 
real actions that directly influence electoral 
outcomes. The actions of the ticket-splitters is the 
truest test of independence irrespective of self- 
identification. For the purpose of this study, actions 
do speak louder than words.
In The American Voter (1960), Independents are 
characterized in a rather negative manner. They did 
not possess good knowledge about the issues, nor clear 
images of the candidates; nor were they interested in 
campaigns in general (DeVries 1972, 42). The 
theoretical impression left by Campbell and his 
associates is that Independents are either apolitical 
in their mind set, or they have latent partisan 
affections, which they seek to obscure (Dennis 1988b,
p.201).
Subsequent studies have modified the earlier
9characterization. The apathy described in The American 
Voter (1960) is not convincingly inherent in 
independence. Indeed, any member of the electorate who 
is so apathetic that he or she does not vote, should be 
considered apolitical, not an Independent. Studies by 
Burnham (1970) and Keith (1977), among others, show 
that Independents display characteristics of political 
awareness on the issues, feel politically competent, 
and are actively engaged in the politics surrounding 
them (Valentine 1980, 169). By virtue of shunning 
partisan party voting cues, Independents also are, to 
varying degrees, engaged sufficiently to make clear and 
logical electoral decisions. They knowledgeably cast 
their votes after autonomously considering the issues 
and candidates involved in any particular elections 
(Valentine 1980, 169).
The classical description of Independents found in 
The American Voter (1960) depicts those members of the 
electorate who are apolitical in their views. The 
modern view of this voting group is, however, more 
complex. Even though Independents shun a partisan 
identification, they are still motivated and are able 
to consider each election on the merits of their 
observations , and then make informed voting decisions 
(Asher 1980, 129). Accordingly, Independents appear to 
cast their votes based on a reasonable and sound
10
decision making process.
The complexity inherent in considering a concept 
that can contain both the diverse dimensions of 
partisanship and independence demands careful scrutiny. 
Jack Dennis' typology of partisan support lists four 
categories that arise when considering the 
multidimensionality of independence based on two self­
description questions from the 1989 National Election 
Study. Respondents who identify with one of the 
political parties and think of themselves as a 
political Independent are classified as Independent 
Partisan Supporters. Respondents who profess no 
partisan preference and think of themselves as 
Independents are classified as Ordinary Independents. 
Respondents who hold to a partisan identity and do not 
think of themselves as Independents are classified as 
Ordinary Partisans. And finally, respondents who do 
not self-identify as either a partisan nor as an 
Independent are classified as Unattached (Dennis 1988a, 
p.85) .
This study will consider the so-called Ordinary 
Independent and Independent Partisan Supporter 
categories. Both categories reflect an Independent 
self-identification, and the difference between the two 
on the issue of partisan identity will prove 
illustrative in explaining ticket-splitting voter
behavior.
The members of the Independent Partisan Supporter 
category will be defined here as Partisan Independents. 
Partisan Independents illustrate the multidimensional 
characteristics involved when observing voter 
motivations. Partisan Independents possess a strong 
sense of independence, while still associating 
themselves with a political party (Valentine 1980,
167). David Valentine and John Van Wingen (1980) 
conclude that these Partisan Independents "are more 
independent, not more partisan, than are weak 
partisans" (Valentine 1980, 179). When the values of 
independence and partisan identity conflict, Partisan 
Independents seem less partisan than weak partisans.
On the other hand, if the values are harmonious, David 
Valentine concludes that a Partisan Independent will 
"appear to be neither less partisan nor more partisan 
than the weak partisans" (Valentine 1980, 179).
Leaners
Most Independents, though valuing independence, 
profess to be closer to one of the parties. Keith 
classifies these Independents as "leaners", and 
observes that leaners vote just like strong partisans 
(Keith et al. 1986, 155). "Leaners are partisan, not 
neutral." "In fact, the leaners display an impressive 
tendency to vote for the candidate of the party they
12
feel closer to; indeed, they are frequently more loyal 
to their party than weak partisans" (Keith 1986, 161). 
This observation has been noted by other studies 
involving the partisan personality of leaners (Abramson 
1983; LeBlanc 1979; Miller 1980). Leaners are 
Independents who have only a psychological 
identification with the classification. Behaviorally, 
their voting performance is the same as a partisan 
identifier.
Ticket-splitters 
Independents who are behaviorally unconstrained by 
party identification, irrespective of professed 
psychological identification, are classified as ticket- 
splitters. Since, ultimately, it is the behavior of 
the voter that affects election results, actual ticket- 
splitting is the surest test of true independence 
(DeVries 1972, 23). It is evident that the 
psychological classification of Independent and the 
behavioral classification of ticket-splitter are not 
interchangeable. For the purpose of this thesis, 
ticket-splitting will be defined by the traditional 
behavioral conceptualization presented by Walter 
DeVries in The Ticket-Splitter; that is, "the 
difference between the vote for candidates for 
President and the U. S. House of Representatives." 
(DeVries 1972, 29).
13
The significance of observing the voting behavior 
of ticket splitters is, according to DeVries, that they 
are "the balance of power in elections and makes about 
one-forth (or more) of the total electorate." In close 
elections, and where a political party is in the 
minority, the ticket-splitter supplies the electoral 
margin of victory (DeVries 1972, 72).
The behavioral independence of ticket-splitters is 
supplemented by involvement in the political process. 
These Independents make carefully reasoned electoral 
decisions and consider the virtues of competing 
candidates and parties. Because of these actions, they 
are the most likely to split the ticket (Meyer 1962, 
73-74) .
Building on previous theoretical framework,
Charles Atkin (1976) proposes the notion that voters 
who are involved in the political process are 
susceptible to responding to the media supplying 
political information and advertising (Kaufmann 1993, 
10). Because of the nonpartisan nature of the 
Independent ticket-splitter, they are more sensitive to 
the short-term forces promulgated by the media (Erikson 
1988, 248).
The careful reasoning demonstrated by ticket- 
splitters is applied by analyzing a candidate's 
personality, the candidate's aptitude in solving the
problems present in society, and the candidate's 
positions on the significant issues surrounding a 
specific election. The influence of party 
identification is inconsequential to ticket-splitters 
when making electoral decisions (DeVries 1972, 15). 
Based on the research of Robert McClure and Thomas 
Patterson (1974), the voting decision, according to 
Karen Kaufmann, "is the aggregation of one's issue 
attitudes and one's beliefs about the candidates and 
their stances regarding the issues" (Kaufmann 1993, 7). 
For the ticket-splitter, the voting act is a series of 
autonomous decisions about first, the candidates, then 
the issues, with party identification and group 
affiliations playing a diminished role in the analyses 
(DeVries 1972, 90).
Studies conducted in 1972 by Miller, Schulman, and 
Declercq, which statistically measure the relative 
effects of candidate image, issues, and party 
identification on voting decisions, found that these 
effects are important. When viewed in the aggregate, 
the mean weights derived from the above studies reveal 
that the relative effect of candidate image is greater 
than for issues, and the issues are of greater 
consequence than party identification. (Erikson 1988, 
277) .2
As society changes, large social coalitions are
15
fragmenting into smaller social arrangements (Havlicek 
1984, 94). Today, the two main political parties do 
not stand as monolithic blocks of contending ideology. 
Theoretically, each party is composed of people who 
have historically coalesced around party principles.
In reality, party principles must compete with the 
individual party member's specific conditions, needs 
and values. Rather than identifying as either just a 
Democrat or Republican, citizens also see themselves as 
being young or old; wealthy, middle class, or poor; 
urban or rural; professional or working class. This 
increases the primacy of voter observations of the 
candidates and issues, and diminishes the role of 
political parties.
A 1986 study by Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 
found evidence that because of the attentiveness 
demonstrated by sophisticated voters, they are more 
sensitive to the quality of the candidate's personal 
characteristics (Erikson 1988, 279). Erikson strongly 
concurs with Miller and his associates that "one of the 
best predictors of a person's vote is simply whether 
the voter likes the personal qualities of the 
Democratic candidate more or less than the personal 
qualities of the Republican candidate". Voters choose 
their preferred candidate on the qualities of 
character, competence, or trustworthiness, making their
16
decision in a completely rational manner. (Erikson 
1988, 274).
Voter policy stands, when considered over multiple 
issues, are also as sound a predictor of voting 
behavior as candidate evaluations that consider 
competence and personality characteristics. In fact, 
both candidate and issue evaluations function as 
effectively as party identification in predicting voter 
behavior (Erikson, p.258).
This chapter has presented various theoretical 
considerations promulgated by scholars trying to 
explain voting behavior. This study will draw 
specifically from the ticket-splitter section of the 
above presentation. The author will consider the 
voter's perceptions of the candidates, issues, and 
parties involved in presidential elections since 1952 
to see if the ticket-splitter theory is an accurate and 
useful means of interpreting modern voting behavior.
Endnotes
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1. Joan Whitely, "Futurists Gaze Into Statistics To 
Make Predictions," Las Vegas Review Journal, 4 August 
1994, sec. C.
2. Janet Buttolph Johnson defines beta weights as 
standardized regression coefficients, "that indicate 
the relative importance of each independent variable in 
explaining the variation in the dependent variable, 
when controlling for all of the other variables in the 
equation." See Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard 
Joslyn, 1991, Political Science Research Methods, 2nd 
ed. Washington D.C.:Congressional Quarterly Inc., 355.
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The function of the ticket-splitter theory is to 
explain electoral victory in terms of the voting 
behavior of a segment of the electorate that does not 
respond to the classical electoral typology centered 
around party identification and influence. The impact 
of this portion of the voting public on electoral 
outcomes is of such consequence that an empirical 
understanding of this group provides the basis of 
creating the winning plurality in modern electoral 
campaigns.
The prediction capability provided by the 
classical model is to be questioned by the ticket- 
splitter theory (DeVries 1972, 37). The unit of 
analysis, the individual voter who rationally splits 
his vote between a presidential candidate of one party 
and a congressional candidate of another, must be 
analyzed by a more complex method than nominal party 
identification. Analysis of this nature will help to 
define the reliability and validity of the ticket- 
splitter theory as a useful empirical tool in
18
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understanding voting behavior in the modern electoral 
environment. Concomitantly, it will also bring into 
question the usefulness of the classical theory of 
voting behavior. The previous chapter of this study 
provided empirical generalizations that can be analyzed 
to determine how predictive the ticket-splitter theory 
actually is.
Burnham (1972) observes that voters who are an 
Independent make a considered vote on the basis of 
their observations of the candidates, the relevant 
issues of the moment, and, to a diminished degree, the 
political parties. DeVries and Tarrance (1972) 
attribute ticket-splitting behavior to the careful and 
reasoned analysis demonstrated in Burnham's typology.
For the purpose of this analysis, the research 
hypothesis is:
Ticket-splitters tend to cast their vote on 
the basis of their evaluation of the 
candidates,issues, and lastly political 
parties.
This operational definition will consider those voters 
who split their ticket and their views on the relevant 
factors.
Opinion polling of both ticket-splitters and 
straight ticket partisans will provide an empirical 
basis for testing the research hypothesis. This method 
of data collection is an accepted research method. The
20
instrument utilized in this analysis is the AMERICAN 
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE 1952- 
1990, sixth release, November 1991. The data file was 
compiled by the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Most ANES 
data are collected from in-person interviews of voting 
age citizens, living in households within the 
contiguous United States, with the exception of 
military bases. Samples in the data set are derived 
from multistage area probability designs.1
Because of the universally-accepted quality of the 
Inter-University Consortium's data set, it is 
reasonable to assume that threats to validity have been 
minimized. All due diligence has been exercised in 
sampling, question wording, and question order, 
questionnaire design, and response rate considerations.
Polling questions that are utilized in this study 
consider, first, the respondent's opinion of their 
political self-identification. Then, attitudes will be 
measured on the traits, affects, and affinity toward 
presidential candidates. Also, the respondents' 
attitudes toward how they perceive each candidate's 
issue stance over four domestic social polices, along 
with their attitudes toward political parties will be 
included.
The data file utilized in this study is a
21
cumulative collection spanning elections from 1952- 
1990. In its totality the data file contains a 
weighted cross-section of 37,706 cases.2 The 
empirical data derived from the data file provides a 
baseline study of ticket-splitting over a 20 election, 
38 year period. The instrument contains approximately 
1200 variables, of which 33 variables are analyzed 
using the SPSS statistical package crosstabulation 
function.3 Thirty-two independent variables are 
crosstabulated with one dependent variable which 
measures both straight ticket and ticket-splitting 
voting behavior. Question wording will be provided in 
an appendix of this study. The sample error for this 
study is +/- 3%.
The research hypothesis will be tested by 
analyzing the correlations between a respondent's 
attitudes and his voting decision. I expect to find 
that when deciding on which candidate for whom to vote, 
the voter will respond to and vote for the individual 
who most positively correlates to his opinions on the 
candidates, the issues, and political parties. If the 
research hypothesis tests to be correct, the predictive 
value of the ticket-splitter theory to forecast 
electoral decisions will be strengthened through the 
empirical verification of theoretical assumptions.
It must be noted that not all of the variables
utilized in the study are compiled from the entire 38 
year span of 1952-1990. This limitation being 
acknowledged, the data file is still valuable in 
studying ticket-splitter voting behavior, and makes it 
possible to reasonably test the ticket-splitter theory 
against empirical reality. Every period of time 
covered by every poll question displays a high 
incidence of ticket-splitting behavior, even when the 
time span of some polling questions are limited to just 
four years.
The reader must make a mental note of the 
following conditions. Variable number 0709, the 
dependent variable, along with variables 0401; 0405; 
0402; 0406; 0403; 0407 and 0409 were asked every 
presidential election year from 1952 through 1988. 
Variable number 0301 was asked every two years from 
1952 through 1990. Variables 0350; 0362; 9086 and 9094 
were asked in 1984 and 1988 only. Variables 0353;
0365; 0354; 0366; 0356; 0368 and 9022 were asked every 
presidential election year from 1980 through 1988. 
Variables 9084; 9092; 9087 and 9095 were asked every 
presidential election year from 1972 through 1988. 
Variables 9083 and 9091 were asked in 1972; 1976; 1980 
and 1988. Variable 0564 was asked every two years from 
1970 through 1990. Variable 0570 was asked every two 
years from 1972 through 1984 and in 1988. Variable
23
0571 was asked in 1972 and 1976; every two years from 
1978 through 1982; and in 1988. Variable 0572 was 
asked every two years from 1982 and 1990. And finally, 
variables 0316; 0320 and 0322 were asked in 1952 and 
1956; 1958; every four years between 1960 and 1972; and 
every two years between 1976 and 1990.
Endnotes
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1. In this study, this method is used to sample the 
population of the United States by defined geographic 
areas. The population is divided into very specific, 
mutually exclusive units called subareas. These 
subareas have identifiable geographic perimeters, which 
allow for a sample of subareas to be extracted. Then a 
list is created made up of housing units existing 
within designated subareas, and a sample of listed 
units is chosen from the designated subareas. Finally, 
all individuals of voting age within the selected 
subareas are interviewed. It is permissible to 
delineate the sample further by drawing a cross section 
of people from within the defined subareas.
2. Johnson writes that to weight a sample means "to 
make a disproportionate sample representative." A 
cross-sectional research design is where "measurements 
of independent and dependent variables are taken at the 
same time; naturally occurring differences in the 
independent variable are used to create quasi- 
experimental and quasi-control groups"; and where all 
irrelevant considerations are statistically controlled 
for. See Johnson, Political Science Research Methods, 
167, 127.
3. Crosstabulation is a table that displays the 
distribution of one variable across the value 
categories of one or more additional variables.
CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
During the period covered in the data set, seven 
different men were elected into the presidency: Dwight 
Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard 
Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush. 
Three of these men, Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan, all 
Republicans, were re-elected to a second term. In all, 
Republican presidential candidates won 7 out of the 10 
presidential elections conducted between 1952 and 1990, 
and, consequently, controlled the White House for 26 
out of a possible 38 years.
The same 38 year era saw 20 congresses elected. 
Seven out of the 20 congresses were controlled in both 
houses by the same party as the president. These 
congresses were the: 83rd, 87th, 88th through the 90th, 
and the 95th and 96th. The 97th through the 9 9th 
congresses saw a period where only the Senate was 
controlled by the same party as the president. In the 
10 elections where both a president and a new House of 
Representatives were elected, the electorate voted for 
a Republican president and a Democratically controlled
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House 6 times: 1956, 1968 and 1972, and 1980 through 
1988. What could be the reason for the presence of 
divided government with a Republican president and a 
Democratically controlled Congress?
Since the early 1950s the relevancy of American 
political parties has been in transition. Scholars 
such as Martin Wattenberg (1986) believe that political 
parties are of decreasing consequence. Walter Dean 
Burnham (1970) discovered that many voters rely less 
and less on party cues to direct their decision when 
casting a vote. Gerald Pomper (1976) warns that this 
diminution of political parties as a factor in 
elections has dire implications for the nation.
Others, like Phillip Converse (1976), do not believe 
the decline of party significance is a permanent 
destabilizing influence. Some like David Broder (1971) 
have written off the usefulness of political parties, 
while others, like Larry Sabato (1988), believe the 
partisan still play an important role in the electoral 
process. What can be agreed on is that due to the fact 
that voters rely less on political parties for cues on 
how to vote, there has been an increase in the presence 
of ticket-splitting in American politics.
Voting Behavior and Political Ideology
The survey employed in this study classified 
voters into seven categories of psychological
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identification: 1) Strong Democrat; 2) Weak Democrat;
3) Independent-Democrat; 4) Independent-Independent; 5) 
Independent Republican; 6) Weak Republican; and 7) 
Strong Republican. These classifications are then 
compared by cross-tabulation to the respondents 
professed voting behavior. They were then sub-divided 
by voting behavior into four categories: straight- 
ticket Democrats/ Democratic ticket-splitters. 
Republican ticket-splitters, and straight-ticket 
Republicans. A Democratic ticket-splitter is defined 
as voter who cast his vote for president for Democrat 
candidates, but voted for a Republican for their 
congressional seat. Conversely, a Republican ticket- 
splitter is a voter who cast his vote for president for 
Republican candidates, and voted for a Democrat for 
their congressional seat. For the sake of this study, 
straight-ticket Democrats and Democratic ticket- 
splitters will be defined as the Democrat coalition, 
and straight-ticket Republicans and Republican ticket- 
splitters will be described as the Republican 
coalition.
(Figure 1.1A about here)
Preliminary analysis displays the expected;
Strong, Weak, and Independent Democrats strongly 
support Democrat presidential candidates, while Strong. 
Weak, and Independent Republicans strongly support
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Republican presidential candidates. Independent- 
Independents generally split their vote between 
Democrat and Republican presidential candidates.
(Figure 1.1B about here)
Closer analysis of only ticket-splitter voting 
within the seven categories of psychological 
identification reveals Republican presidential 
candidates' electoral advantage as explained by the 
ticket-splitter theory. There is demonstrated 
defection by Strong, Weak, and Independent Democrats to 
Republican candidates. Most Strong, Weak, and 
Independent Republicans stay loyal to their party's 
presidential candidate. Independent-Independents 
supported Republican presidential candidates by a 
margin of more than 3.5 to 1. The data reveal that 
there was some defection to Democratic presidential 
candidates by some Independent, Weak, and Strong 
Republican identifiers, but their influence was minimal 
on presidential elections between 1952 and 1990, with 
the possible exception of the closely contested I960 
presidential election. The ticket-splitter theory 
holds that the margin of victory is to be found 
primarily in the ticket-splitter voting behavior. This 
is clearly demonstrated in these elections. Between 
1952 and 1990, Republicans were in the presidency 
almost 70% of the time. Also, the data clearly reveal
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that Republican presidential candidates have garnered 
72% of the ticket-splitter vote during that period.
This realization gives impetus to continue 
investigating presidential elections through the 
application of the ticket-splitter theory.
Voting Behavior and Candidate Trait Analysis
This section of the analysis appraises respondent 
voting behavior when considering four candidate 
character traits - intelligence, inspiration, knowledge 
and strong leadership; reasons to vote both for and 
against the candidates; strength of respondent's vote 
for the candidates; and the affect of the candidate on 
the voting respondent when considering the candidates' 
"LIKES" and "DISLIKES" in context.
(Figures 2.10A+B, 2.15A+B, 2.20A+B, 2.25A+B, 2.30A+B, 
2.35A+B, 2.40A+B, 2.45A+B about here)
Analysis of the four character traits is applied 
to the two candidates over four opinion categories.
The survey questions offer the respondent two positive 
responses - "EXTREMELY WELL" and "QUITE WELL", and two 
negative responses - "NOT TOO WELL" and "NOT WELL AT 
ALL". The respondents opinions reveal distinct patterns 
of voting behavior.
Generally, both the Republican and Democrat 
candidates were perceived as being intelligent and 
knowledgeable, but there was no consensus of perception
that the candidates possessed the characteristics of a 
strong leader who can inspire the electorate. It is 
apparent that the electorate as a whole perceives 
intelligence and knowledge as being necessary, but not 
sufficient, characteristics of an executive.
Perceptions of presidential aptitude by a majority of 
the electorate must be accompanied by the 
acknowledgement that the candidate has actually 
demonstrated executive attributes before conviction in 
the candidate's executive abilities can replace 
admiration for the candidate's executive qualities.
When appraising the voting behavior displayed for 
the qualities of inspiration and strong leadership 
(Figures 2.20A+B and 2.25B, questions 0353 and 0365 and 
2.40A+B and 2.45A+B, questions 0356 and 0368) a clear 
partisan distinction is revealed in the voting 
behavior. The Democrat coalition positively supports 
its candidates and is more negative when considering 
Republican candidates. The reverse is demonstrated by 
the Republican coalition. This performance supports 
Bruce Keith’s theory (1986) on the nature of leaners.
In this instance, ticket-splitters do demonstrate 
partisan inclinations and form coalitions with pure 
partisans. As illustrated by the data, with the 
electorate dividing rather evenly on party lines, there 
can be no general consensus of perception over any of
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the candidates' abilities to engender inspiration or to 
lead.
The data presented in Figures 2.10A+B and 2.15A+B 
(questions 0350 and 0362) and 2.30A+B and 2.35A+B 
(questions 0354 and 0366) depict another facet of the 
Independent's voting behavior, which is the 
multidimensional aspect presented by Jack Dennis (1988) 
and David Valentine (1980). Here, there is general 
consensus by the electorate that, in general, Democrat 
and Republican presidential candidates are perceived as 
being intelligent and knowledgeable. These character 
traits generate complex patterns accommodating both 
partisan and nonpartisan voting behavior. The 
observations fall predominantly within a range of three 
categories even though the scale allows for four answer 
categories. The data reveal observations being placed 
into a range that goes from "EXTREMELY WELL" to "NOT 
TOO WELL". Partisan coalition support and opposition 
are present at the poles of these figures. That is, 
citizens who voted for a candidate, be they straight- 
ticket or ticket-splitting voters, will have a high 
regard for their candidate, and, conversely, citizens 
who voted against a candidate will have a low regard 
for the candidate. It is in the middle, or "QUITE WELL" 
category, that nonpartisan patterns appear. General 
unanimity is demonstrated irrespective of demonstrated
voting preference. Ticket-splitters do not demonstrate 
the partisan patterns represented in Figures 2.20A+B, 
2.25A+B, 2.40A+B and 2.45A+B. Figures 2.10A+B,
2.15A+B, 2.30A+B, and 2.35A+B present empirical 
evidence that contending theories of the nature of 
independence can coexist within the same data set, 
increasing the difficulty of forming a general theory 
of political independence that will aide in predicting 
the voting behavior of ticket-splitters.
(Figures 3.10A+B, 3.15A+B, 4.10A+B, 4.15A+B about here) 
Figures 3.10A to 4.15B again demonstrate the- 
multidimensional characteristic inherent in voting 
behavior. The scale for Figures 3.10A+B and 3.15A+B 
(questions 0401 and 0405) range from "0" positive 
mentions to "5" positive mentions. Figures 4.10A+B and 
4.15A+B (questions 0402 and 0406) range from "0" 
negative mentions to "5" negative mentions. "0" for all 
scales will be defined as neutral. When used in 
Figures 3.10A+B and 3.15A+B, the "0" category 
demonstrates a lack of any positive mentions regarding 
the candidates, rather than the presence of any 
negative mentions. And, for Figures 4.10A+B and 
4.15A+B, the "0" category demonstrates the lack of any 
negative mentions regarding the candidates, rather than 
the presence of any positive mentions. For Figures 
3.10A+B and 3.15A+B, the greater the score means a
higher number of positive mentions attributed to the 
candidates, and translates into greater perceived 
approval for them. For Figures 4.10A+B and 4.15A+B, the 
greater the score means a higher number of perceived 
negative mentions attributed to the candidates, and 
translates into greater perceived objection to them.
All eight figures reveal similar patterns over the 
scales. The "0" category reveals partisan voting 
behavior in all the figures under discussion. For 
Figures 3.10A+B and 3.15A+B, it appears that straight- 
ticket voters and ticket-splitters who demonstrate the 
least appreciation toward the candidates, having 
nothing good to mention about them, have a propensity 
to vote against them. And, as revealed in Figures 
4.10A+B and 4.15A+B, straight-ticket voters and ticket- 
splitters who demonstrate the least dislike toward 
certain candidates, having nothing negative to mention 
about them, have a propensity to vote for those 
candidates. Here, ticket-splitters behave like the 
"leaners" Keith (1986) defines them to be.
The "1" category in Figures 3.10A+B to 4.15A+B 
reveals a general nonpartisan consensus being 
demonstrated. Ticket-splitters especially show this 
nonpartisan characteristic. Whether they voted for 
Republican or Democratic candidates, ticket-splitters 
appear to be open-minded enough to consider that each
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candidate is deserving of at least one positive and one 
negative mention. Considering this opinion category, 
ticket-splitters now seem to demonstrate the 
independent nature that DeVries attributes to them.
As both the positive and negative scales increase, 
nonpartisanship is eliminated, and partisanship 
returns. Categories "2" to "5" demonstrate this 
throughout all of the figures being considered. 
Ticket-splitters again appear to act like leaners, 
precipitating the reconstitution of the Democrat and 
Republican coalitions.
(Figures 5.10A+B, 5.15A+B, 6.1A+B about here)
Figures 5.10A+B and 5.15A+B (questions 0403 and 
0407) represent the respondents' affect towards the 
candidates. The scales range from "-5" to "+5". The 
"0" category represents the neutral mid-point where 
neither 'likes' nor 'dislikes' are attributed to the 
candidates. The results for Figures 5.10A+B are 
computed by taking the number of Democratic 
presidential candidates "LIKES" minus the number of 
Democratic candidates "DISLIKES". Figures 5.15A+B are 
measured in the same manner, but consider opinion about 
the Republican presidential candidates. The more 
negative a score, the more negative the affective 
measure is for the candidates. The more positive a 
score, the more positive the affective measure is for
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the candidates.
Figures 5.10A+B show that Republican partisans and 
Republican ticket-splitters are, expectedly, much more 
negative to neutral in the affective measure towards 
Democrat candidates, while Democrat partisans and 
Democratic ticket-splitters are positive in their 
evaluation of the candidate. In Figures 5.15A+B, where 
the question of affect is directed towards Republican 
candidates, the data show the opposite of what was 
presented in Figures 5.10A+B. Again a strong partisan 
correlation is presented. Ticket-splitters acting as 
"leaners" joined with loyal partisans to form 
coalitions. The data clearly show that positive 
affection for the candidate will be manifested as 
electoral support.
Figures 6.1A+B (question 0409) represents the 
respondents' net affect towards both candidates. The 
scales range from "-10", representing the maximum 
Republican candidate affective measure, to "+10", which 
represents the maximum Democratic candidate affective 
measure. Again, the "0" category represents the 
neutral mid-point where neither "LIKES" nor "DISLIKES" 
are attributed to either candidate. The result of the 
net affect measurement is the difference between two 
sums: the sum of the Democratic presidential candidate 
"LIKES" and Republican presidential candidate
"DISLIKES" MINUS the sum of the Democratic presidential 
candidate "DISLIKES" and Republican presidential 
candidate "LIKES". Again, ticket-splitters acting as 
leaners joined with loyal partisans to form coalitions. 
Those ticket-splitters and Republican partisans who 
vote for Republican presidential candidates demonstrate 
a higher net affective measure for them than for 
Democrat presidential candidates. And conversely, 
ticket-splitters and partisan Democrats who support 
Democrat presidential candidates evidence a higher net 
affective measure for them than for Republican 
presidential candidates. The data, again, clearly show 
that positive affection for a candidate will engender 
electoral support.
(Figures 7.1A+B about here)
Figures 7.1A+B (question 9022) reflect how 
respondents answered the question of whether their 
voting preference for president could be defined as 
"STRONG" or "NOT STRONG". The data reflect the fact 
that Republican partisans and Republican ticket- 
splitters acted in consort and preferred Republican 
presidential candidates more strongly than Democratic 
partisans and Democratic ticket-splitters acting in 
consort. Republican partisans were 20% stronger in 
their support of Republican candidates than Democratic 
partisans were in supporting Democrat candidates. And
Republican ticket-splitters were almost 20% stronger in 
their decision to vote for Republican candidates than 
Democratic ticket-splitters were in their decision.
The considerable electoral success evidenced by 
Republican presidential candidates in the period 
between 1980 and 1988 is accompanied by a confidence 
and strength of conviction by the electors in their 
candidate choices. The ability to generate this 
strength of conviction appears to be a motivating 
component towards achieving electoral victory, and also 
generates the most crossover voting.
Voting Behavior and Perceived Issue Stands 
by Presidential Candidates
This section analyzes the perceptions of the 
respondents when considering the candidates1 stands on 
domestic issues. Again, voting behavior is sub-divided 
into four categories: straight-ticket Democrats, 
Democratic ticket-splitters, Republican ticket- 
splitters, and straight-ticket Republicans. These 
categories are cross-tabulated over a 7-point scale 
used to measure the respondents perceived candidate 
placement over four policy issue choices. The issues 
considered are: Should the federal government be 
responsible for the improvement of the social and 
economic position of blacks? Is the federal government 
responsible to see to it that every person has a good
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job and standard of living? Should women have an equal 
role with men in running business, industry, and 
government? And should the federal government reduce 
services even in areas such as health and education in 
order to reduce spending, or should the government 
increase spending in these areas?
(Figures 8.10A+B, 8.15A+B, 9.10A+B, 9.15A+B, 10.10A+B, 
10.15A+B, 11.10A+B, 11.15A+B, about here)
The 7-point scale for three of the perceived 
policy stances: Government aid to blacks (questions 
9084 and 9092 - Figures 8.10A+B and Figures 8.15A+B); 
guaranteed jobs and standard of living (questions 9087 
and 9095 - Figures 9.10A+B and 9.15A+B); and women's 
role in society (questions 9083 and 9091 - 10.10A+B and 
10.15A+B), range from "1" to "7". For these questions, 
perceptions in the "1" to "2" range are categorized as 
liberal. Perceptions falling into the "3" to "5" range 
are categorized as moderate, and the "6" to "7" are 
categorized as conservative. The scale regarding 
services and spending (questions 9086 and 9094, Figures
11.10A+B and 11.15A+B) also range from "1" to "7". For 
these questions, perceptions in the "1" to "2" range 
are categorized as conservative, "3" to "5" are 
categorized as moderate, and "6" to "7" are categorized 
as liberal.
Two patterns emerge from this set of questions. 
First, Democrats are viewed as liberal to moderate when
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considering the four questions, and Republicans are 
viewed as a moderate to conservative on three of the 
questions. On the fourth question, women's equal role 
in society, opinion is more dispersed. Here 
Republicans are generally seen as a liberal to 
moderate, but there is also substantial amount of 
opinion defining Republicans as conservative on this 
question.
The second pattern to appear is that partisan 
Republicans and Republican ticket-splitters view 
Democrats as being more liberal than moderate on three 
issues, while partisan Democrats and Democratic ticket- 
splitters view Republicans as more conservative than 
moderate on all four questions. It appears that 
supporters see their candidate as being more moderate 
than the opponent on the issues examined. In light of 
the scope of this investigation, it is very significant 
to observe that these patterns are consistent when 
considering just ticket-splitters. The data plainly 
reveal that on the domestic policies investigated, 
ticket-splitters are motivated to support the candidate 
whom they perceive as moderate, and eschew supporting 
candidates whom they discern as too liberal or too 
conservative.
Voting Behavior and Party Proximity to Respondent
This section examines the perceptions of the
respondents when considering their proximity to the two 
major parties on the same four domestic issues 
presented in the previous section. Again, voting 
behavior is sub-divided into four categories: straight- 
ticket Democrats, Democratic ticket-splitters, 
Republican ticket-splitters, and straight-ticket 
Republicans. These categories are cross-tabulated over 
three categories: Closer to Democrats, Equidistant, and 
Closer to Republicans. Also, this section examines the 
affect and net affect of the Democratic and Republican 
party on the respondents.
(Figures 12.1A+B, 13.1A+B, 14.1A+B, 15.1A+B, 16.10A+B, 
16.15A+B, 17.1A+B about here)
All four policy questions reveal an interesting 
pattern which corroborates the theoretical 
considerations of Valentine (1980) and Dennis (1988a, 
1988b) presented in the first chapter. That is, when 
voting behavior is viewed in the aggregate, the 
electorate demonstrates the presence of both 
partisanship and nonpartisan independence existing 
together. Also, DeVries' (1972) observation that party 
identification is playing a diminished role in the 
minds of the electorate is corroborated. The 
substantial opinion formation around the equidistant 
scores reveal that, for many respondents, neither 
party's position on the issues is attractive.
Figures 12.1A+B (question 0564) reveal that
overall, the respondents feel slightly closer to the 
Republican party on the issue of aid to blacks. The 
data show that 43.8% percent of Democratic ticket- 
splitters feel closer to the Democratic party while 
only 23.1% feel closer to the Republicans. Conversely, 
50.1% of the Republican ticket-splitters identify with 
the Republican party, and only 17.0% feel closer to the 
Democrats. Almost one-third of both the Democrat and 
Republican ticket-splitters are in the equidistant 
category when considering this policy issue. These 
figures reveal the partisan and independent 
characteristics that coexist concomitantly in the mind 
of the voters as theorized by Valentine (1980).
Complex multidimensionality inherent in ticket- 
splitting voting behavior, namely the presence of two 
seemingly contradictory attributes in the same 
measurement, is clearly demonstrated in Figure 12.IB.
The same pattern of partisanship and independence 
emerges when studying Figures 13.1A+B (question 0570). 
Generally, the respondents feel closer to the 
Republican party on the issue of whether the government 
should guarantee jobs and a standard of living to the 
citizenry. Most ticket-splitters feel closer to the 
party of the candidate they voted for, yet almost one- 
third of the Democrat and Republican ticket-splitters 
are equidistantly positioned between the two parties.
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Figures 15.1A+B (question 0572) again show both 
partisanship and independence existing together, but 
the respondents are very evenly divided over the issue 
of government spending and services. Neither party, 
nor its respective candidates, can claim any advantage 
when considering this issue. On this issue, only one- 
fifth of the Democrat and Republican ticket-splitters 
defined their position as equidistant between the 
parties.
Only the issue of women's role in society (Figures 
14.1A+B, question 0571) provides an advantage to the 
Democratic party over the Republican party. What is 
interesting though is the high number of ticket- 
splitters who do not identify with either party on this 
policy question. Fully 47.1% of the Democrat and 58.1% 
of the Republican ticket-splitters do not identify with 
the party of the candidate they voted for.
Figures 16.10A+B and 16.15A+B (questions 0316 and 
0320) are very vivid in describing both the partisan 
and independent nature of the electorate when 
considering the major political parties. The scales 
range from "-5" to "+5". The "0" category represents 
the neutral mid-point where neither 'likes' nor 
'dislikes' are attributed to a party. The results for 
Figures 16.10A+B are computed by taking the number of 
Democratic party 'likes' minus the number of Democratic
party 'dislikes'. Figures 16.15A+B are measured in the 
same manner, but consider opinion about the Republican 
party. The more negative a score, the more negative 
the affective measure is for the party. The more 
positive a score, the more positive the affective 
measure is for the party. Figures 16.10A+B show that 
Republican partisans and Republican ticket-splitters 
are, expectedly, much more negative to neutral in the 
affective measure towards the Democratic party, while 
Democratic partisans and Democratic ticket-splitters 
are neutral to positive in their evaluation of the 
party. In Figures 16.15A+B, where the question of 
affect is directed towards the Republican party, the 
data show the opposite of what was presented in Figures 
16.10A+B. Again a strong partisan correlation is 
presented. Ticket-splitters acting as "leaners" joined 
with loyal partisans to form coalitions.
Figures 17.1A+B (question 0322) represent the 
respondents' net affect towards both political parties. 
The scales range from "-10", representing the maximum 
Republican party affective measure, to "+10", which 
represents the maximum Democratic party affective 
measure. As before, the "0" category represents the 
neutral mid-point where neither 'likes' nor 'dislikes' 
are attributed to either party. The result of the net 
affect measurement is the difference between two sums:
the sum of the Democratic party "LIKES" and Republican 
party "DISLIKES" MINUS the sum of the Democratic party 
"DISLIKES" and Republican presidential party "LIKES". 
Again, ticket-splitters acting as "leaners" joined with 
loyal partisans to form coalitions. Those Republican 
ticket-splitters and Republican partisans who vote 
demonstrate a higher net affective measure for the 
Republican party than the Democratic party. And 
conversely, Democratic ticket-splitters and partisan 
Democrats evidence a higher net affective measure for 
the Democratic party than the Republican party.
The data presented in Figures 16.10A+B, 16.15A+B 
and 17.1A+B, clearly shows that positive affection for 
a party will translate into electoral support for that 
party's candidate. But it also demonstrates that the 
majority of the ticket-splitters fall between the 
maximum Republican party and maximum Democratic party 
affective measure, with a large percentage finding 
themselves neutral to the positive or negative 
influences of either political party.
This concludes the presentation of the empirical 
data. The next chapter examines the data within the 
hypothetical and theoretical framework introduced in 
the first chapter.
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
Hypothetical Considerations 
The empirical data presented in the preceding 
chapter substantiates the relationship between the 
ticket-splitters' evaluation of the candidates, issues, 
and parties, and their voting behavior. These 
evaluations defy partisan self-identification, and it 
is the cumulative effect of ticket-splitter behavior 
that creates the margin of victory in modern 
presidential elections. Generally there is a positive 
correlation between the positive evaluation of the 
candidates, issues and the candidates' parties by the 
ticket-splitter and his support for that candidate. 
There is also evidence that a positive evaluation alone 
may not be motivation enough to inspire the ticket- 
splitter' s support. This anomaly complicates the 
definition of ticket-splitter behavior, but it does 
confirm the independent nature of the ticket-splitter, 
which confirms the primary supposition of DeVries' 
ticket-splitter theory.
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Theoretical Considerations
To reiterate, the ticket-splitter theory rests on 
some fundamental premises. Devries (1972) posits that 
the electoral sub-group of ticket-splitters makes up to 
about one-quarter of the electorate in any presidential 
election, and is the balance of power in an election. 
Because of the ticket-splitters importance and apparent 
independence, the prediction probability of the modern 
campaign environment has less to do with the supporting 
roles of political parties, and more to do with issue 
evaluations and the appeal and positive affection that 
a voter possesses for the candidate he chooses to cast 
his vote for. Partisan identification is a diminished 
influencing agent, and the primary mode of persuasion 
is a two way direct communication between the candidate 
and the electorate via primarily electronic media.
Since the ticket-splitter theory is based on the 
independent behavior of the voter, the studies of other 
scholars concerning the phenomenon of independence was 
included in this thesis. Alan Meyer (1962) wrote that 
Independents make deliberate voting decisions only 
after appraising the merits of the contending 
candidates and their respective parties. Robert 
Erikson (1988) found that one of the best predictors of 
future voting behavior is simply whether the voter 
likes the traits of one candidate over those of the
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opponent. Jack Dennis (1988a, 1988b) promulgated the 
idea of the multidimensionality and complexity of self- 
identifying polling questions with regard to 
independence. David Valentine (1980) wrote that 
partisanship and independence can coexist in the mind 
of a voter.
In apparent contradiction to the above 
observations, Keith and his associates (1986) 
discovered that Independents are actually bound by 
partisan inclinations that motivate them to vote for 
the political party they feel closer to. Most so 
called Independents behave this way; any declaration to 
the contrary is a falsehood.
Theoretical Points of Agreement
One has only to observe Table 1. and Figure 1.IB 
to see the truth inherent in DeVries statement that 
ticket-splitters constitute a considerable part of the 
electorate and could be the balance of power in 
electoral victories. The data show this clearly in 
presidential elections between 1952 and 1988. The ROW 
TOTALS column of Table 1. presents the fact that 
straight-ticket voters made up 78.8% of the electorate 
and ticket-splitters constituted the remaining 21.2%.
In fact, ticket-splitters voted for Republican 
presidential candidates by an almost three to one 
margin. Figure 1.1B illustrates the defection of
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Strong, Weak, and Independent Democrats, along with 
Independent-Independents. These pure Independents 
voted Republican by an almost four to one margin. 
Republican presidential candidates are able to retain 
the self-identifying Republicans who ticket-split. The 
primacy placed on the ticket-splitters' vote by DeVries 
cannot be refuted. Over the thirty-eight year period 
of the study, Republican candidates have demonstrated 
an ability to both attract ticket-splitters and win 
presidential elections.
Robert Erikson's (1988) observation that a 
positive affection towards a candidate is a legitimate 
predictor of future voting behavior can be seen in 
Figures 5.10A to 5.15B. The more the candidates' 
perceived "LIKES" outnumber their "DISLIKES" the 
greater the chance of the candidates attracting the 
vote. Figures 6.1A and 6.IB demonstrate Erikson's 
statement even more clearly. This pattern of positive 
affection and voting propensity can also be seen in 
Figures 16.10A to 17.IB where political parties are 
concerned.
Figures 7.1A and 7.IB can lend insight into the 
success enjoyed by Republican presidential candidates 
during the 1980s. Those who voted for Republican 
presidential candidates were obviously stronger in 
conviction than those who voted for Democratic
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presidential candidates. This apparent aggregate 
strength of conviction appears to be a reliable 
explanation of electoral success.
In Figures 8.10A to 11.15B, the data suggest that 
the key to interpreting the traits of a candidate in 
relation to issues is the perception of moderation. 
Voters seem to aggregate around the center of the 
ideological spectrum and will vote for the candidate 
they perceive to be there also. Opposition to a 
candidate is found at the poles of the ideological 
spectrum. To like a candidate means to perceive his 
issue positions as moderate.
Jack Dennis1(1988a, 1988b) and David Valentine's 
(1980) theoretical observations are corollaries. The 
multidimensionality and complexity of the self- 
identifying polling question concerning independence 
can be explained by Valentine's observation that 
partisanship and independence can coexist in the mind 
of the voter. The data suggest that this complex 
coexistence is present not only in the psychological, 
self-identifying sense, but also in the behavioral 
sense of actual voting conduct.
Figure 2.10B demonstrates that more Republican 
ticket-splitters perceive the "QUITE WELL" 
classification as more descriptive of Democrat 
candidates than Democratic ticket-splitters do.
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Conversely, Figure 2.15B reveals that more Democratic 
ticket-splitters perceive this classification as more 
descriptive of Republican presidential candidates than 
it is for Democrat presidential candidates.
Now, consider Figures 12.IB, 13.IB and 15.IB. 
Ticket-splitters demonstrate both partisan and 
independent tendencies existing for the same issues at 
the same time. One would expect that ticket-splitters 
would be equidistant between the two parties. This is 
a clear demonstration of independence, but what about 
the two other classifications? The data clearly show a 
partisan inclination within the ticket-splitter sub­
group. The presence of partisanship and independence 
coexisting at the same time is indeed curious, it adds 
complexity, and demonstrates the multidimensional 
nature of the ticket-splitter. It also leads the 
observer to reconsider the efficacy of the ticket- 
splitter theory itself.
Theoretical Points of Contention
The work completed by Keith (1986) gives insight 
into the phenomena of self-identifying Independents who 
lean toward one party. The data compiled in this study 
confirms Keith's observation conserning Independents. 
Here, it is not psychologically self-identified 
Independents showing partisan leanings, but rather it 
is behavioral Independents who demonstrate partisanship
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in their voting behavior. It is this fact that 
directly challenges the ticket-splitter theory.
DeVries' (1972) theory is based on the diminution 
of parties as an influence in voting behavior. Also, 
DeVries finds little affinity between self-identifying 
Independents and ticket-splitters. Much of the data in 
this report suggests the converse.
It is to be noted though that DeVries1 
observations are also substantiated by some of the 
data. In Figure 1.1B the presence of partisanship is 
so vague as to make self-identified partisan Democrats 
who split their ticket generally find Republican 
presidential candidates more acceptable than Democratic 
presidential candidates. Figures 2.10B and 2.15B also 
suggest the apparent diminution of partisanship. The 
QUITE WELL category in Figure 2.10B shows that 
Republican ticket-splitters held Democratic candidates' 
intelligence in higher regard than Democratic ticket- 
splitters. Figure 2.15B shows the opposite; Democratic 
ticket-splitters held Republican presidential 
candidates' intelligence in higher regard than 
Republican ticket-splitters. This observation is 
seemingly anomalous to the presence of partisanship.
But this fact is to be considered in relation to the 
presence of partisanship in the EXTREMELY WELL and NOT 
TOO WELL categories. The multidimensional nature of
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ticket-splitters is observed in many other instances 
throughout the data set. Figures 3.10B, 4.15B, 12.IB, 
13.IB, and 15.IB, for example, reveal how the ticket- 
splitter' s voting behavior can accommodate both 
independence and partisanship. This reality has the 
curious quality of both confirming and denying DeVries1 
theory with the same measurement. What is certain is 
that DeVries' observations concerning the voting 
behavior of ticket-splitters deserves more 
investigation.
Theoretical Accommodation 
To be fair, any investigation into the usefulness 
of the ticket-splitter theory must consider all the 
components, which together, constitute the supposition. 
This thesis has investigated the theory through the 
application of only one of the elements - voting 
behavior based on opinion polling. The theory in its 
entirety is composed of not only the application of 
opinion polling, but it also employs demographic data, 
media market applications and designations, and voting 
behavior culled from voter registration and election 
documents. These components are then administered 
through organizational activities. The true worth of 
the ticket-splitter theory is not in explaining 
abstractions, but rather it is to be found in its 
application as a methodological blueprint utilized to
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gain an electoral majority. The scope of considering 
the theory in its entirety is beyond this thesis. To 
do so would entail investigating the actual records of 
a given campaign that employs this methodology.
Instead, this thesis is a rudimentary investigation 
into the basic premises that are essential in assessing 
its utility.
The application of this narrow criteria is proving 
to be both expositive and perplexing. The data show 
that, indeed, the ticket-splitter sub-group makes up a 
considerable portion of the electorate in the period of 
1952 to 1990. Also, in the aggregate, the candidate 
and the party who was successful in motivating ticket- 
splitters to vote for them have controlled the White 
House the predominance of the time. But this is 
countered by the discovery that ticket-splitters, when 
considering the candidates, issues, and parties, 
demonstrate behavior that is reminiscent of a party 
partisan. This appears to be a direct contradiction to 
the premise that political parties are of no predictive 
value in assessing the future voting behavior of 
ticket-splitters. It would be difficult to argue that 
this behavior occurs merely by chance. It would be 
equally difficult to discount the significance of the 
ticket-splitter theory as a means of organizing a 
victorious political campaign. The size, presence, and
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importance of the sub-group to electoral success 
necessitates further investigation into the nature of 
the ticket-splitter voter.
Questions and Recommendations for Further Study
The ANES instrument, although voluminous, is not 
sensitive enough to thoroughly illuminate the voting 
behavior of ticket-splitters. Future investigation 
into the voting behavior of ticket-splitters should 
include more accurate measures of opinion, along with 
investigation into the two-way communication process 
between a candidate and the electorate. Also, 
demographic and legal voting records would have to be 
included to complete a sufficient analysis for 
predicting ticket-splitter voting behavior.
The completion of the data collection and analysis 
leaves me with more questions than answers. For 
instance, is the partisanship observed by ticket- 
splitters authentic or just coincidence? Could the 
voting phenomena be a result of the fact that, in most 
instances, only two candidates are running in an 
election, and the ticket-splitter's behavior is simply 
a response to an either - or proposition and the result 
gives only the appearance of partisanship? Or, could 
it be that the observed partisanship is real as a 
result of both partisans and ticket-splitters 
evaluating the candidates, issues, and parties and
coming to the same conclusion? And, if the observed 
partisanship is factual, do partisans and ticket- 
splitters arrive at the same conclusion by the same 
method of evaluation? Considering the questions 
presented above, I would like to offer some ideas on 
improving opinion polling measures, and also, how to 
generate meaningful measures concerning the two-way 
communication process.
Opinion measures should be concerned with 
evaluating the candidate, issues, and political parties 
involved in specific elections. To accomplish these 
measurements with more precision than that afforded in 
the ANES instrument, opinions concerning the candidates 
and the parties could better be measured using a 
semantic differential scale.1 This method would 
afford the researcher to more meticulously judge the 
electorate's opinion on the candidates and parties by 
measuring three implicit dimensions: evaluation, 
potency, and activity (Johnson, p.89). The questions 
employed in the ANES poll only evaluates opinion, they 
do not render any indication of potency or activity 
that a semantic differential technique would afford. 
Concerning the issues, the employment of a Guttman 
scale would allow the researcher to deduce not only if 
the electorate judges an issue in a favorable or 
unfavorable light, but also the strength or weakness of
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opinion concerning the issue.2
The two-way communication procedure is an integral 
element of the ticket-splitter campaign methodology 
(DeVries 1972, 73). Because ticket-splitters are 
theorized to not be dependent upon partisan cues, they 
respond to short-term forces originating primarily from 
the electronic media as the prime orientation method in 
their voting decision (Erikson 1988, 248). Considering 
the primacy of the information and communication 
process to attracting the ticket-splitter, it is 
absolutely necessary to any further examination of - 
ticket-splitter voting behavior to perfect and include 
a methodology for investigation into how ticket- 
splitters are motivated to vote for a candidate by the 
utilization of voting cues promulgated by the media.
DeVries (1988), among others, offers insightful 
recommendations on how this data can be generated. 
Because the media is stratifying into smaller and 
narrower special-audience segments, the complexity of 
understanding the influence of these exclusive venues 
on ticket-splitters requires that investigators 
initiate experimental research to examine media 
techniques for effectiveness in influencing these 
special-audience segments (DeVries 1972, 116).
In order to facilitate this experimental research, 
Steven Ansolabehere (1991) has divided media research
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into four categories of media effects. The influence 
of media can, in Ansolabehere's opinion, "impart 
information, persuade individuals to support or oppose 
a candidate, set the agenda for political campaigns, 
and influence the criteria on which electoral 
preferences are based" (Ansolabehere 1991, 121). To 
best study these effects of the relationship between 
the media and the electoral process, Ansolabehere 
recommends joining research involving "information 
production" with "effects research", because "voter 
responses and candidate strategies are endogenous 
components of campaigns" (Ansolabehere 1991, 131). 
Ansolabehere suggests that "political research of the 
future should be less concerned with providing evidence 
of media influence and more concerned with explaining 
the difference between strong and weak communications" 
(Ansolabehere 1991, 135). Seemingly, this approach 
would be very useful in understanding the nuances of 
ticket-splitters and will further the examination of 
this critical and complex minority within the 
electorate. Once it is understood what influences 
ticket-splitters, questions as to how they are 
influenced could then be better understood, and the 
efficacy of the ticket-splitter theory could be more 
accurately discerned.
The accuracy of the most researched and refined
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media strategy must be directed by an equally 
researched and refined targeting methodology.
Political targeting is the means by which a 
sophisticated campaign can focus a specified 
motivational message to a finely defined audience of 
potential voters in any given political race.
Targeting is accomplished by merging and then cross- 
references demographic databases with political 
databases (Havlicek 1984, 87).
The Census Bureau is the preeminent assembler and 
repository of population data within the United States. 
It dispenses, at a fee, neighborhood statistics 
containing demographic data on the general population 
by geographic sub-divisions called blocks and tracts. 
This information is then divided by zip code and area 
code (Havlicek 1984, 88,102).
Political data are collected by gathering voting 
behavior records from the appropriate authorities, and 
also by employing polling methodology. Voting behavior 
data consist of current voter registration records, 
along with past records of voting participation. The 
resultant compilation of information contains details 
on trends operating within the electorate at the time. 
This database is merged with opinion polling 
information concerning such levels of analysis as the 
respondent's life cycle, life style, issue concerns,
59
issue positions, and partisan predispositions (Havlicek 
1984, 93).
Summary
During the 38 year period of this study, fully 21% 
of the electorate split their ticket. Ticket-splitters 
have voted for Republican presidential candidates 72% 
of the time, and helped to propel Republicans into the 
White House in 7 out of 10 elections. They have also 
voted for a Republican presidential candidate and a 
Democratically controlled House 6 times. Ticket- 
splitting clearly has been an important factor in 
American politics, and as such, the influence of this 
electoral behavior is worthy of study and 
understanding. This thesis has verified certain 
characteristics of ticket-splitting behavior that help 
explain the nature of these independent voters.
When considering presidential candidates, the 
ticket-splitter displays both partisan and independent 
voting behavior. Partisanship is manifested when the 
ticket-splitter joins straight-ticket partisans to form 
a coalition in support of one or the other candidate. 
Independence is demonstrated by the ticket-splitter's 
ability to consider both candidates in an election and 
to evaluate both the positive and negative traits of 
each.
The ticket-splitter will vote for the candidate he
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has high regard for, and will vote against a candidate 
he holds in low esteem. Said another way, the ticket- 
splitter who has nothing negative to say about a 
candidate will vote for that candidate, and if the 
ticket-splitter has nothing positive to say about a 
candidate, he will vote against him. A Republican 
ticket-splitter will view the Democratic candidate in a 
negative to neutral light, while a Democratic ticket- 
splitter will give the same Democratic candidate a 
positive evaluation. When the same affective measure 
is directed towards the Republican candidate, the 
opposite result is seen. A positive or negative 
affective measure of a candidate by the ticket-splitter 
serves as a reliable predictor of his voting behavior.
The analysis of the perceptions of the ticket- 
splitter when considering a candidate's stand on 
domestic issues also proves useful in predicting voting 
behavior. Over the four domestic issues examined, 
Democrat candidates are perceived as liberal to 
moderate, while Republican candidates are perceived as 
moderate to conservative. The ticket-splitter will 
support a candidate when he perceives that candidate as 
more moderate than the candidate's opponent. The 
ticket-splitter will shun a candidate he perceives as 
too liberal or too conservative. Moderation is of more 
value than strong ideology to the ticket-splitter. So,
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in essence, for the ticket-splitter, to like a 
candidate means to perceive his issue positions as 
moderate.
The ticket-splitter's voting behavior when 
considering his perceptions of his proximity to the 
major political parties on the same issues previously 
investigated again demonstrates multidimensional voting 
patterns. Generally, the ticket-splitter feels closer 
to the party of the presidential candidate he voted 
for, but this fact is tempered by the actuality that 
fully one-third of the ticket-splitter subgroup 
perceives itself as equidistant between the major 
parties. A Republican ticket-splitter feels negative 
to neutral when considering a Democrat, while feeling 
neutral to positive about the Republican opponent. 
Conversely, a Democratic ticket-splitter feels more 
negative to neutral towards the Republican candidate 
and neutral to positive towards the Democrat opponent.
Conclusion
The ability to accurately identify, locate and 
target the ticket-splitter and then predict his 
behavior is a challenge, and this will only grow more 
demanding as society continues to transform at an even 
more rapid pace. In order to better understand the 
nuances of ticket-splitting behavior, opinion polling 
will have to be refined. Polling will have to be
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election specific, more frequent and more accurate, 
because of the influences of a highly specialized media 
on an increasingly fragmented electorate. Television's 
500 channel future will provide a profusion of outlets 
for political persuasion, and pollsters must understand 
the effects of the technology on the electorate. All 
of these variables virtually assure that the cost of 
political campaigns will escalate as an arms race of 
technology, innovation and skill will be implemented to 
discern and manage campaigns in an environment of 
constant change.
The ticket-splitter phenomenon will be an 
increasing occurrence. Candidate-centered, media- 
driven campaigns rely less and less on political 
parties. Electoral victory will mean building 
coalitions of party partisans and sympathetic ticket- 
splitters as more and more of the electorate recognize 
no partisan identity when registering to vote. Ticket- 
splitting may also increase with the rise of a strong 
and viable third party acting as a countervailing force 
to the prevailing and seemingly ineffectual two-party 
system. The ticket-splitter phenomenon is the result 
of the electorate searching for real political 
leadership.
It is obvious that the challenges facing this 
nation will continue to get more urgent. Issues such
as the rising national debt and international trade 
imbalance, the declining standard of living being 
experienced by American citizens, and real potential 
for the bankruptcy of entitlement programs will 
inevitably demand attention. These realities leave the 
voter anxious for any candidate, irrespective of party 
identification, who can competently deal with the 
issues. The voter will probably remain undecided until 
just before the election as he critically evaluates the 
candidate he will support, and this critical 
disposition will compel him to be more prone to ticket- 
split. Unfortunately, the electorate will also be 
susceptible to demagoguery. Also, if there are no 
really qualified individuals elected to the White 
House, this nation will experience a series of one-term 
presidencies as the ticket-splitter moves his 
allegiance to the next candidate who can persuade the 
ticket-splitter that he has the skill to solve the 
nation's problems. Members of Congress will also be 
subject to the same discriminating evaluation. Another 
bi-product of ineffectual federal leadership will be an 
increase in ticket-splitting on the state level as the 
concerned voter will search for the candidate with the 
vision and ability to deal with the issue challenges 
created by an incompetent federal government.
It is apparent to this observer that a thorough
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examination of the utility of the ticket-splitter 
theory is warranted, and that the investigator needs to 
consider all of the components of data collection 
discussed above, as well as the appropriate compilation 
of the data so that the investigator can say with 
absolute confidence that this theory is a suitable 
alternative to the present methodology of interpreting 
voting behavior strictly through partisan 
predispositions. I believe that the ticket-splitter 
theory is currently being utilized in modern campaigns; 
it is the mandate of good science to observe and study 
this active theory in order to accurately determine the 
nature and limits of its function in explaining voting 
behavior. I trust that this initial study provides 
reflective information to that end.
Endnotes
1. A semantic differential technique , Johnson writes 
is used to measure "attitudes towards an object in 
which respondents are presented with a series of 
opposite adjective pairs." See Johnson, Political 
Science Research Methods, 91.
2. A Guttman Scale measures increasingly difficult 
evaluations of support for an issue attitude.
APPENDIX I 
SURVEY QUESTIONS
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0709 TICKET-SPLITTING PRESIDENTIAL VS. CONGRESSIONAL 
VOTE. derived from V704 and V707
1. Dem. Pres. - Dem. Congressional
2. Dem. Pres. - Rep. Congressional
3. Rep. Pres. - Dem. Congressional
4. Rep. Pres. - Rep Congressional
0. DK/NA who voted for in presidential or 
congressional race; did not vote; refused to say if 
voted ETC.
0704 Who did you vote for for President? (MAJOR PARTY 
VOTES)
1. Democrat
2. Republican
0707 How about the election for (Congressman)the House 
of Representatives in Washington. Did you vote for a 
candidate for (Congress)the U. S. House of 
Representatives? (IF YES:) Who did you vote for? 
Which party was that?
1. Democrat
2. Republican
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 1; FIGURES 1.1A, 1.1B)
0301 Generally speaking, do you usually think of 
yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, 
or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call 
yourself a strong (REP/DEM) or a not very strong 
(REP/DEM)? (IF INDEPENDENT, OTHER, OR NO PREFERENCE)
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or 
Democratic party?
1. Strong Democrat
2. Weak Democrat
3. Independent - Democrat (also no-preference and
minor party leaners)
4. Independent - Independent
5. Independent - Republican (also no- preference and
minor party leaners)
6. Weak Republican
7. Strong Republican
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(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; FIGURES 2.10A, 2.10B)
0350 I am going to read a list of words and phrases 
people may use to describe political figures... Think 
about the Democratic presidential candidate. The first 
phrase is "intelligent." In your opinion, does the 
phrase "intelligent" describe the Democratic 
presidential candidate ...
1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; FIGURES 2.15A, 2.15B)
0362 I am going to read a list of words and phrases 
people may use to describe political figures... Think 
about the Republican presidential candidate. The first 
phrase is "intelligence." In your opinion, does the 
phrase "intelligence" describe the Republican 
presidential candidate...
1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; FIGURES 2.20A, 2.20B)
0353 I am going to read a list of words and phrases 
people may use to describe political figures... Think 
about the Democratic presidential candidate. The 
second phrase is "inspiring." In your opinion, does 
the phrase "inspiring" describe the Democratic 
presidential candidate ...
1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
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(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; FIGURES 2.25A, 2.25B)
0365 I am going to read a list of words and phrases 
people may use to describe political figures... Think 
about the Republican presidential candidate. The 
second phrase is "inspiration." In your opinion, does 
the phrase "inspiration" describe the Republican 
presidential candidate...
1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; FIGURES 2.30A, 2.30B)
0354 I am going to read a list of words and phrases 
people may use to describe political figures... Think 
about the Democratic presidential candidate. The third 
phrase is "knowledge." In your opinion, does the 
phrase "knowledge" describe the Democratic presidential 
candidate ...
1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; FIGURES 2.35A, 2.35B)
0366 I am going to read a list of words and phrases 
people may use to describe political figures... Think 
about the Republican presidential candidate. The third 
phrase is "knowledge." In your opinion, does the 
phrase "knowledge" describe the Republican presidential 
candidate...
1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
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(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; FIGURES 2.40A, 2.4OB)
0356 I am going to read a list of words and phrases 
people may use to describe political figures... Think 
about the Democratic presidential candidate. The 
fourth phrase is "leadership." In your opinion, does 
the phrase "leadership" describe the Democratic 
presidential candidate ...
1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; FIGURES 2.45A, 2.45B)
0368 I am going to read a list of words and phrases 
people may use to describe political figures... Think 
about the Republican presidential candidate. The 
fourth phrase is "leadership." In your opinion, does 
the phrase "leadership" describe the Republican 
presidential candidate...
1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 3; FIGURES 3.10A, 3.10B)
0401 Now I would like to ask you about the good and bad 
points of the two candidates for President. Is there 
anything in particular about the Democratic 
presidential candidate that might make you vote for 
him? What is that? Anything else?
0 .
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
Zero positive mentions 
One positive mention 
Two positive mentions 
Three positive mentions 
Four positive mentions 
Five positive mentions
likes) 
likes) 
likes) 
likes) 
likes) 
likes)
71
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 3; FIGURES 3.15A, 3.15B)
0405 Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad 
points of the two candidates for President. Is there 
anything in particular about the particular Republican 
presidential candidate that might make you want to vote 
for him? What is that? Anything else?
0. Zero positive mentions
1. One positive mention
2. Two positive mentions
3. Three positive mentions
4. Four positive mentions
5. Five positive mentions
likes) 
likes) 
likes) 
likes) 
likes) 
likes)
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 4; FIGURES 4.10A, 4.10B)
0402 Is there anything in particular about the 
Democratic presidential candidate that might make you 
want to vote against him? What is that? Anything 
else?
0. Zero negative mentions
1. One negative mention
2. Two negative mentions
3. Three negative mentions
4. Four negative mentions
5. Five negative mentions
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes)
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 4; FIGURES 4.15A, 4.15B)
0406 Is there anything in particular about the 
Republican presidential candidate that might make you 
want to vote against him? What is that? Anything 
else?
0. Zero negative mentions
1. One negative mention
2. Two negative mentions
3 . Three negative mentions
4. Four negative mentions
5. Five negative mentions
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes)
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(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 5; FIGURES 5.10A, 5.10B)
04 03 This is the number of Democratic presidential 
candidate 'likes' minus the number of Democratic 
presidential candidate 'dislikes' (V401-V402).
-5 Maximum negative
0 Neutral
+5 Maximum positive
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 5; FIGURES 5.15A, 5.15B)
0407 This is the number of Republican presidential 
candidate 'likes' minus the number of Republican 
presidential candidate 'dislikes' (V405-V406).
-5 Maximum negative
0 Neutral
+5 Maximum positive
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 6; FIGURES 6 . 1A, 6.IB)
0409 The net affect toward major party presidential 
candidates is the difference between two sums: the sum
of Democratic presidential candidate 'likes' and 
Republican presidential candidate 'dislikes' MINUS the 
sum of Democratic presidential candidate 'dislikes' and 
Republican presidential candidate 'likes:' [V401+V406]
-[V402+V405], which is the same as: V403-V407.
-10 Maximum Republican 
0 Neutral 
+10 Maximum Democrat
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 7; FIGURES 7.1A, 7.IB)
9022 (ASKED OF Rs WHO VOTED): How about the election
for president? Did you vote for a candidate for 
president? (IF YES) Who did you vote for? Would you 
say that your preference for this candidate was strong 
or not strong?
1. Strong
2. Not Strong
73
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 8; FIGURES 8.10A, 8.10B)
9084 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should make every possible effort to improve the social 
and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the 
government should not make any special effort to help 
blacks because they should help themselves. Where 
would you place the Democratic presidential candidate 
on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R).
1. Government should help blacks/minorities
2 . - 6.
7. Blacks/minorities should help themselves
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 8; FIGURES 8.15A, 8.15B)
9092 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should make every possible effort to improve the social 
and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the 
government should not make any special effort to help 
blacks because they should help themselves. Where 
would you place the Republican presidential candidate 
on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R).
1. Government should help blacks/minorities
2 . - 6 .
7. Blacks/minorities should help themselves
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 9; FIGURES 9.10A, 9.10B)
9087 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should see to it that every person has a job and a good 
standard of living. Others think the government should 
just let each person get ahead on their own. Where 
would you place the Democratic presidential candidate 
on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
(7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Government see to job and a good standard of 
living
2 . - 6 .
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own
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(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 9; FIGURES 9.15A, 9.15B)
9095 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should see to it that every person has a job and a good 
standard of living. Others think the government should 
just let each person get ahead on their own. Where 
would you place the Republican presidential candidate 
on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
(7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Government see to job and a good standard of 
living
2 . - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on own
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 10; FIGURES 10.10A, 10.10B) 
9083 Recently there has been a lot of talk about 
women's rights. Some people feel that women should 
have an equal role with men in running business, 
industry and government. Others feel that women's 
place is in the home. Where would you place the 
Democratic presidential candidate on this scale or 
haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE 
SHOWN TO R)
1. Women and men should have an equal role
2 . - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 10; FIGURES 10.15A, 10.15B) 
9091 Recently there has been a lot of talk about 
women's rights. Some people feel that women should 
have an equal role with men in running business, 
industry and government. Others feel that women's 
place is in the home. Where would you place the 
Republican presidential candidate on this scale or 
haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE 
SHOWN TO R)
1. Women and men should have an equal role
2. - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home
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(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 11; FIGURES 11.10A, 11.10B)
9086 Some people think the government should provide 
fewer services, even in areas such as health and 
education, in order to reduce spending. Other people 
feel that it important for the government to provide 
many more services even if it means an increase in 
spending. Where would you place the Democratic 
presidential candidate on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE 
SHOWN TO R)
1. Government should provide many fewer services: 
reduce spending a lot.
2 . - 6 .
7. Government should provide many more services: 
increase spending a lot.
9094 Some people think the government should provide 
fewer services, even in areas such as health and . 
education, in order to reduce spending. Other people 
feel that it important for the government to provide 
many more services even if it means an increase in 
spending. Where would you place the Republican 
presidential candidate on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE 
SHOWN TO R)
1. Government should provide many fewer services: 
reduce spending a lot
2 . - 6.
7. Government should provide many more services: 
increase spending a lot
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 12; FIGURES 12.1A, 12.IB) 
0564 Derived from V830 and V517-V518.
1. Closer to Democrats
2. Equidistant
3. Closer to Republicans
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0830 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should make every possible effort to improve the social 
and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the 
government should not make any special effort to help 
blacks because they should help themselves. Where 
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you 
thought much about it? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Government should help minority groups/ blacks
2 . - 6 .
7. Minority groups/ blacks should help themselves
0517 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should make every possible effort to improve the social 
and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the 
government should not make any special effort to help 
blacks because they should help themselves. Where 
would you place the Democratic party on this scale?. 
(7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R).
1. Government should help minority groups
2 . - 6.
7. Minority groups should help themselves
0518 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should make every possible effort to improve the social 
and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the 
government should not make any special effort to help 
blacks because they should help themselves. Where 
would you place the Republican party on this scale? 
(7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Government should help minority groups
2 . - 6.
7. Minority groups should help themselves
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 13; FIGURES 13.1A, 13.IB) 
0570 Derived from V809 and V513-V514.
1. Closer to Democrats
2. Equidistant
3. Closer to Republican
77
0809 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should see to it that every person has a job and a good 
standard of living. Others think the government should 
just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would 
you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you 
thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Government see to job and a good standard of 
living
2 . - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own
0513 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should see to it that every person has a job and a good 
standard of living. Others think the government should 
just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would 
you place the Democratic party on this scale, or 
haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE 
SHOWN TO R)
1. Government see to job and a good standard of 
living
2. - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own
0514 Some people feel that the government in Washington 
should see to it that every person has a job and a good 
standard of living. Others think the government should 
just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would 
you place the Republican party on this scale, or 
haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE 
SHOWN TO R)
1. Government see to job and a good standard of 
living
2. - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own
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(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 14; FIGURES 14.1A, 14.IB) 
0571 Derived from V834 and V537-538.
1. Closer to Democrats
2. Equidistant
3. Closer to Republicans
0834 Recently there has been a lot of talk about 
women's rights. Some people feel that women should 
have an equal role with men in running business, 
industry and government. Others feel that women's 
place is in the home. Where would you place yourself 
on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? 
(7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Women and men should have an equal role
2 . - 6 .
7. Women's place is in the home
0537 Recently there has been a lot of talk about 
women's rights. Some people feel that women should 
have an equal role with men in running business, 
industry and government. Others feel that women's 
place is in the home. Where would you place the 
Democratic party on this scale or haven't you thought 
much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Women and men should have an equal role
2. - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home
0538 Recently there has been a lot of talk about 
women's rights. Some people feel that women should 
have an equal role with men in running business, 
industry and government. Others feel that women's 
place is in the home. Where would you place the 
Republican party on this scale or haven't you thought 
much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Women and men should have an equal role
2. - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home
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(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 15; FIGURES 15.1A, 15.IB) 
0572 Derived from V839 and V541-542.
1. Closer to Democrats
2. Equidistant
3. Closer to Republicans
V839 Some people think the government should provide 
fewer services, even in areas such as health and 
education, in order to reduce spending. Other people 
feel that it important for the government to provide 
many more services even if it means an increase in 
spending. Where would you place yourself on this 
scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
(7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Government should provide many fewer services: 
reduce spending a lot.
2. - 6.
7. Government should provide many more services: 
increase spending a lot.
V541 Some people think the government should provide 
fewer services, even in areas such as health and 
education, in order to reduce spending. Other people 
feel that it important for the government to provide 
many more services even if it means an increase in 
spending. Where would you place the Democratic party 
on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Government should provide many fewer services: 
reduce spending a lot.
2 . - 6 .
7. Government should provide many more services: 
increase spending a lot.
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0542 Some people think the government should provide 
fewer services, even in areas such as health and 
education, in order to reduce spending. Other people 
feel that it important for the government to provide 
many more services even if it means an increase in 
spending. Where would you place the Republican party 
on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
1. Government should provide many fewer services: 
reduce spending a lot.
2 . - 6.
7. Government should provide many more services: 
increase spending a lot.
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 16; 16.10A, 16.10B)
0316 This is the number of Democratic party ’likes' 
minus the number of Democratic party ’dislikes’ (V314- 
V315).
-5 Maximum negative 
0 Neutral 
+5 Maximum positive
0314 Is there anything in particular that you like 
about the Democratic party? What was that? Anything
else?
0. Zero positive mentions (likes)
1. One positive mention (likes)
2. Two positive mentions (likes)
3. Three positive mentions (likes)
4. Four positive mentions (likes)
5. Five positive mentions (likes)
0315 Is there anything in particular that you dislike 
about the Democratic party? What is that? Anything 
else?
0. Zero negative mentions (dislikes)
1. One negative mention (dislikes)
2. Two negative mentions (dislikes)
3. Three negative mentions (dislikes)
4. Four negative mentions (dislikes)
5. Five negative mentions (dislikes)
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0320 This is the number of Republican party 'likes' 
minus the number of Republican party 'dislikes' (V318- 
V319) .
-5 Maximum negative 
0 Neutral
+5 Maximum positive
0318 Is there anything in particular that you like 
about the Republican party? What was that? Anything 
else?
0 . Zero positive mentions (likes)
1 . One positive mention (likes)
2. Two positive mentions (likes)
3. Three positive mentions (likes)
4 . Four positive mentions (likes)
5. Five positive mentions (likes)
0319 Is there anything in particular that you dislike 
about the Republican party? What is that? Anything 
else?
0. Zero negative mentions
1. One negative mention
2. Two negative mentions
3. Three negative mentions
4. Four negative mentions
5. Five negative mentions
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes) 
(dislikes)
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 17; FIGURES 17.1A, 17.IB)
0322 The net affect toward parties is the difference 
between two sums: the sum of the Democratic party
'likes' and Republican party 'dislikes' MINUS the sum 
of Democratic party 'dislikes' and Republican party 
'likes': [V314+V319] - [V315+V318], which is the same
as: V316-V320.
-10 Maximum Republican 
0 Neutral
+10 Maximum Democrat
APPENDIX II 
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TABLE 2. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES: TRAITS AND AFFECTS
DEMOCRATIC
CANDIDATES
EXTREMELY
WELL
QUITE
WELL
NOT TOO 
WELL
NOT WELL 
AT ALL
INTELLIGENCE
DEM/DEM 28.8 65.6 5.0 0.6
DEM/REP 31.8 60. 6 7.6 0.0
REP/DEM 18.4 67 . 7 13 .1 0.8
REP/REP 17 . 4 64 . 4 15 .5 2 . 6
INSPIRING
DEM/DEM 14 . 8 47 . 6 31. 9 5.7
DEM/REP 10.2 46.5 38.5 4.8
REP/DEM 3.2 23.6 54 .6 18.5
REP/REP 2 . 1 20 .1 54 .8 23 . 0
KNOWLEDGABLE
DEM/DEM 28.4 63 . 6 6.9 1. 1
DEM/REP 27 .5 63.5 8.5 0.5
REP/DEM 10 . 9 63.7 21.5 4 . 0
REP/REP 10.2 59 .2 26.3 4.4
STRONG
LEADERSHIP
DEM/DEM 17 .5 54 .1 24 .6 3.8
DEM/REP 13.7 57 .4 25.7 3.3
REP/DEM 2 . 1 25.0 49.7 23.1
REP/REP 1. 7 21.9 51.0 25.4
SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT 
INTELLIGENCE N = 2080; INSPIRING N = 2774; 
KK3WLEDGABLE N = 2793; STRONG LEADERSHIP N = 2735
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TABLE 2. - CONTINUED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES: TRAITS AND 
AFFECTS
REPUBLICAN
CANDIDATES
EXTREMELY
WELL
QUITE
WELL
NOT TOO 
WELL
NOT WELL 
AT ALL
INTELLIGENCE
DEM/DEM 13.3 46 . 7 29.7 10.3
DEM/REP 17. 6 58. 8 23 .5 0 . 0
REP/DEM 36.3 56.4 6.6 0 . 7
REP/REP 44.4 52. 1 3.0 0.5
INSPIRING
DEM/DEM 3.3 18 . 6 49.6 28.5
DEM/REP 6.2 22 . 7 53 .1 18 . 0
REP/DEM 19. 3 47.3 29.2 4.2
REP/REP 26 . 1 49 . 0 23 .1 1.8
KNOWLEDGABLE
DEM/DEM 10.8 45 . 7 29 .1 14 . 4
DEM/REP 15.5 50.8 28.5 5.2
REP/DEM 30.5 57 .5 10.4 1 . 6
REP/REP 37 . 2 55 . 7 6.4 0 . 7
STRONG
LEADERSHIP
DEM/DEM 4 . 3 26 . 8 46 . 1 22 . 9
DEM/REP 5.4 34 .2 45.7 14 . 7
REP/DEM 29 . 1 53.9 14 . 6 2 . 4
REP/REP 35.7 54 .1 9.4 0 . 8
SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT 
INTELLIGENCE N = 2148; INSPRING N = 2839 
KNOWLEDGABLE N = 2 863; STRONG LEADERSHIP N = 2 816
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TABLE 7. STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE
STRONG
NOT
STRONG
DEM/DEM 63.3 36.7
DEM/REP 54.9 45.1
REP/DEM 74.1 25.9
REP/REP 83.2 16.8
SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT 
N = 2912
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TABLE 12. PROXIMITY TO PARTIES: AID TO MINORITIES
CLOSER
TO
DEMOCRATS EQUIDISTANT
CLOSER
TO
REPUBLICAN
DEM/DEM 54.9 28.7 16.5
DEM/REP 43.8 33.1 23.1
REP/DEM 17.0 32 .8 50.1
REP/REP 10.9 29.2 59.9
SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT 
N = 4018
TABLE 13. PROXIMITY TO PARTIES: GUARANTEED JOBS/ STANDARD 
OF LIVING
CLOSER
TO
DEMOCRATS EQUIDISTANT
CLOSER
TO
REPUBLICAN
DEM/DEM 56.6 23.9 19.5
DEM/REP 40.7 30.2 29.1
REP/DEM 14.8 30.3 54.9
REP/REP 8.4 23.1 68.6
SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT 
N = 4004
96
TABLE 14. PROXIMITY TO PARTIES; WOMEN'S EQUAL ROLE
CLOSER
TO
DEMOCRATS EQUIDISTANT
CLOSER
TO
REPUBLICAN
DEM/DEM 48.3 41.4 10.3
DEM/REP 43.3 47.1 9.6
REP/DEM 20.9 58. 1 21.0
REP/REP 18.8 54.6 26.6
SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT 
N = 2943
TABLE 15. PROXIMITY TO PARTIES: GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES/SPENDING
CLOSER
TO
DEMOCRATS EQUIDISTANT
CLOSER
TO
REPUBLICAN
DEM/DEM 68.5 18.5 13.0
DEM/REP 56.5 20.9 22.6
REP/DEM 21.7 20.1 58.2
REP/REP 9.8 16.8 73.5
SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT 
N = 1742
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